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Why Comparative History? A Unity of Difference 
 So much has been published on the First World War that it 
might be more worthwhile to ask, why the Great War again? A 
new call for a reevaluation the war seems to be most trifling, and 
probably met with an occasional yawn: surely someone has 
developed an adequate interpretation by now. However, recent 
efforts by numerous historians in Europe, such as Jay M. Winter, 
Annette Becker, and Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, have shown that 
this assertion would be quite wrong. Since the end of the war in 
1918, there have been numerous historical paradigms, each 
focusing on different “configurations” that were believed to be 
important in remembering the war. The aim here is to argue that to 
fully understand the First World War we must examine the 
collective response of the national communities that fought it.  
Naturally, as the war dragged on, and as the cost in life and 
material rose, the representations of the national communities 
changed to adapt to the situation of the times. It can even be said 
that this is the beginning of the change of the nationalist narrative 
from the cultural to the political: after all, words such as “threat”, 
“security”, and “sacred” all belong to the conservative political 
camp. The origins of totalitarianism, whether fascist, Nazi, or 
communist, can be directly traced back to the Great War and the 
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development of the integrated national community. There is 
something to be said of Martin Heidegger’s concern about the 
totalizing and enframing processes that occur in the twentieth 
century, although he would find different sources for this. 
Whatever the origin, the fact is that since the beginning of the 
Modern Age, the issues of identity, both for the individual, and for 
his connection to society, has been of primary concern. It is 
therefore essential to examine the cultural modes of representation 
used by the peoples of the past which they used to aid in making 
sense of their own world, and not to merely trace the notions of 
“progression”, whether if it is a supposed progression of 
technology, political systems, economics, or liberty. Henri Bergson 
was correct that time is duration. However, in order to come to 
express the actions, feelings, ideas, and emotions of our 
predecessors, we must examine it one expression at a time, and 
hopefully, just hopefully, a larger picture will become clear. 
 In a sense, this paper is an exercise in cultural history, in 
which it examines what Jay Winter calls “representations.”  To 
Winter this is merely a part of the shifting paradigm in First World 
War studies, corresponding to the third historiographical 
configuration: cultural history.1 To Winter, “cultural history is a 
history of the intimate…It is a history of signifying practices; it 
studies how men and women make sense of the world in which 
they live.”2  These signifiers can be found in the many ways that 
collective national communities represented their world through 
art, literature, media, music, toys, games, monuments, etc. What 
makes the First World War so important in the terms of the 
national community is how the populations that made up these 
communities responded to the war and the sacrifices made during 
it: “Social identities are legitimized through commemoration. Here 
is one of the major characteristics of contemporary cultural life: 
identity is value.”3 However, the historian must be cautious so as 
not to overstep these cultural signifiers, for the war itself may be 
given too much precedence and itself reified.  In his own 
                                                
1 Jay Winter and Antoine Prost, The Great War in History: Debates and 
Controversies, 1914 to the Present (New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), 25-31. 
2 Ibid., 29. 
3 Ibid., 27-28. 
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argument, Winter maintains that the shift to cultural history was 
made in response to the fall of the Marxist paradigm, where 
histories today do not make sense because of their objectivity, “but 
precisely [because of] their subjectivity, and the question of how 
representative are they is now deemed meaningless.”4 The search 
is not for all-encompassing histories that provide universal 
explanations; rather it is for a history of everyday life, what the 
Germans call the Alltagsgeschichte.  The study of the 
representations that national communities used to define their 
world during specific points in history is called “mentalités.” It is 
what Winter has called “the mental furniture of populations” in the 
past: “Mentalité in this discourse means visceral commitments 
rather than ideologies, unspoken assumptions rather than political 
or social programs.”5 With the decline of historical materialism, 
the turn is made towards the ideas and representations that make 
up the human condition.  For all intents and purposes, this is the 
era of a new historical idealism. 
 This shift to cultural history has been closely aligned with 
the First World War, and with warfare in general.  Stéphane 
Audoin-Rouzeau coined the term “war culture” (culture de guerre) 
alluding to the conceptual mental framework men and women 
draw on to make sense of their world at war. In a series of studies 
on childhood, war atrocities, and mourning practices, Audoin-
Rouzeau showed the way this war culture seeped into every area of 
domestic life.6 He goes so far to argue that war strips man down to 
his barest essentials, allowing the historian to see visibly his ideas 
and beliefs:  
 
The violence specific to warfare is a prism that 
refracts many otherwise invisible aspects of the 
world. Entire societies can be seen anew, but one 
must be willing to look closely. In paroxysms of 
                                                
4 Ibid., 27. 
5 Jay Winter, Foreword, in Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, Men At War, 1914-1918: 
National Sentiment and Trench Journalism in France during the First World 
War (Washington D.C.: Berg, 1995), ix. 
6 Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, Men At War, 1914-1918: National Sentiment and 
Trench Journalism in France during the First World War (Washington D.C.: 
Berg, 1995),164. 
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violence everything is stripped naked - starting with men, 
their bodies, their fantasies and desires, their fears, 
passions, beliefs hatreds…the motivations that 
allow them to kill their fellow men and endure the 
terror of confrontation - these pertain to something 
essential - something we shall call their 
‘representations’.7 
 
Audoin-Rouzeau falls in line with the work of British military 
historian John Keegan, in challenging the Clausewitzian notion 
that “war is politics by other means”, both stating a deep truth: war 
is first and foremost a cultural act.8  However, the inseparable 
character of the nation and the people brings merit to this argument 
that war is the creation and unification of culture by other means 
against external “enemies.” After all, had Clausewitz not also said 
“The passions which break forth in war must already have a latent 
existence in the peoples”?9 
 
The Discourses of the National Community 
In an essay entitled, “Of Men and Myths: The Use and 
Abuse of History and the Great War,” Holger H. Herwig examines 
five case studies in which myths about historical events were 
created, and elaborated upon.10 Herwig uses the term myth, not “in 
Joseph Campbell’s sense, whereby myths are designed to teach us 
how to search for meaning, to seek the essence of being alive, and 
to feel the spiritual potentialities of life,” but in the “classic Greek 
sense, in which the myth, for all its inconsistencies and absurdities, 
when accepted as truth, represents the learning and wisdom of a 
                                                
7 Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, 14-18: Understanding the 
Great War (New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 2002), 16-17. 
8 Ibid., 18. Cf. John Keegan, The Face of Battle (New York, NY: Viking Press, 
1976). 
9 Carl von Clausewitz, On War Vol. 1, trans. Colonel J.J. Graham (London: K. 
Paul, Trench, Trubner, and Company, 1908), 26. 
10 Holger H. Herwig, “Of Men and Myths: The Use and Abuse of History and 
the Great War,” The Great War and the Twentieth Century, eds. Jay Winter, 
Geoffrey Parker, and Mary R. Habeck (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
2000), 299-330. 
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society.”11 Myths are an essential part of modern political 
culture. They constitute that web of shared meaning by which the 
members of a complex society form and sustain their association, 
providing the unity as something natural, self-evident.12 The 
narration of these myths becomes important, for the names that are 
given to the objects in the narration, as well as those who are either 
telling the story or those who the story is being told to, creates 
identities, and the narrative myth becomes a part of identity.  
Names therefore are important in the telling of a story, in that, as 
Jean-François Lyotard has pointed out: “Names - define a world, a 
world of names - the cultural world. This world is finite because in 
it the number of available names is finite.”13 These stories of 
narration fill the gaps between these names, and in the case of a 
myth, according to Herwig’s usage, they are placed in the 
particular gaps of a story that are unique to the experience of a 
society. 
 To expand on Herwig’s example, the historian at times 
provides a helping hand in creating and developing narratives that 
can be taken as either/or truth and identity creation. This is 
particularly so when the historian belongs to a specific community 
that has for a long time accepted a myth as an integral part of 
national identity.  Indeed, after Hayden White and the linguistic 
turn, and after Alain Corbin and Roger Chartier and the history of 
representations, it is impossible to even take eye-witness accounts 
at their face value without raising questions as to how they were 
formulated, constructed, and prefigured by their author’s views. 
Ernest Gellner states that “Nationalism is not the awakening of 
nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not 
exist.”14 However, there must be a distinction made: Gellner 
supposes that all nationalism masquerades as a falsity, and does 
not consider its creation. Benedict Anderson places his emphasis 
on the “imagining” of the national community, in which it is 
                                                
11 Ibid., 299-300. Cf.  Joseph Campbell, The Power of Myth (New York, NY: 
Doubleday, 1988). 
12 Jeffrey Verhey, The Spirit of 1914: Militarism, Myth, and Mobilization in 
Germany (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 9. 
13 Jean-François Lyotard, The Post-Modern Explained (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 45. 
14 Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 
1964), 169. 
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imagined “because the members of even the smallest nation will 
never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear 
of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their 
communion.”15 More importantly in terms of the narration, as 
Anderson points out, is that “communities are to be 
distinguished…by the style in which they are imagined.”16 This 
places the emphasis of study on the narrative itself, as it is the 
acceptance of the narrative as truth that becomes part of the 
creation of identity.  
 It is again Jay Winter who points out two kinds of narrative 
discourses that were in use in Europe during, and before the First 
World War. The historical tradition, influenced by Paul Fussell’s 
The Great War and Modern Memory, which focused primarily on 
the British war poets, argued that the war had swept away a set of 
literary conventions and gave us a new and deeply ironic voice.  
This was a point in human history where mankind attacked the 
abstract notions that had been followed blindly: it was the break of 
tradition, and the creation of the Modern.  As Fussell writes: “the 
Great War was perhaps the last to be conceived as taking place 
within a seamless, purposeful ‘history’ involving a coherent stream 
of time running from past through present to future…the Great 
War took place in what was, compared with ours, a static world, 
where the values appeared stable and where the meanings of 
abstractions seemed permanent and reliable.”17 The argument that 
the Great War represented a break in history, and discontinuity 
with the past and with the Modern has been well commented on.  
Kenneth Silver’s Esprit de Corps: The Art of the Parisian Avant-
garde and the First World War writes that after 1914, “self-
control, self-abnegation, and self-denial of so many kinds became 
a national modus vivendi” and that this mood dominated the visual 
arts as it did the rest of social life.  It was only after the war had 
ended that artists could again begin to “invent the world” without 
                                                
15 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991), 6. 
16 Ibid., 6. 
17 Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press 1976), 21. 
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the shackles of war-related constraints.18 Thus, the war was for 
Silver, a step backwards: modernity was regressive not 
progressive.  Modris Eksteins presents us with another view of 
Modernism in his Rites of Spring: the Great War and the Birth of 
the Modern Age.  Speaking from a distinctly German perspective 
(although Eksteins deals with Britain and France, the main drive of 
the argument is clear), the author echoes the birth of Modernity as 
a creation born of chaos, quoting Elias Canetti: “the banging of 
windows, and the crashing of glass are the robust sounds of fresh 
life, the cries of something new-born.”19 Eksteins’ argument 
follows that the questioning of traditional values, indeed the 
Nietzschean “transvaluation of values” of violence, power, 
aggression, that denote Nazi culture can be traced back to the war 
enthusiasm felt by Germans in August 1914.  This is the reason 
why Eksteins sees profound links between facets of Stravinsky’s 
“Rite of Spring,” the theatricality of the Great War, and the 
primitive choreography of Nazi “culture.” 
 In response, Jay Winter argues in Sites of Memory, Sites of 
Mourning—based on the “collective remembrance” of the Great 
War—Modernity was not solely the only form used to make sense 
of the time.  For Winter, “Modernism was a cultural phenomenon,” 
for sure, but at the same time “a set of what may be called 
‘traditional values’—classical, romantic, or religious images and 
ideas widely disseminated in both elite and popular culture before 
and during the war,” remained.20 For Winter, the war did not 
represent a clear break from the Modern and the traditional, as both 
“forms of imagining the war were evident long before the 
armistice.  Furthermore, the distinction was at times more 
rhetorical than real. Modernists didn’t obliterate traditions; they 
stretched, explored, and reconfigured them in ways that alarmed 
conventional artists, writers, and the public at large.”21 Winter 
notes quite correctly that Modernism follows its own teleology, 
                                                
18 Kenneth Silver, Esprit des Corps: The Art of the Parisian Avant-garde and 
the First World War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 388-389. 
19 Modris Eksteins, Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern 
Age (New York, NY: Anchor Books, 1989), 55. 
20 J.M. Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 2-3. 
21 Ibid., 3. 
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that is always dependent on the past:  
 
‘Modernism’ - more of a temperament than a set of 
fixed beliefs - left behind as neatly and surgically as 
some scholars suggest a host of images and 
conventions derived from eighteenth and 
nineteenth-century religious, romantic, or classical 
traditions…it is the very teleology of this position - 
the search for precursors or exponents of what later 
critics have admired or rejected - which makes the 
‘modernist’ hypothesis about the cultural history of 
the early twentieth century just as misleading as 
other tendentious interpretations of recent or not so 
recent history.22  
 
It is interesting here to compare Winter’s work with Anderson’s 
conception of the temporal trappings of nationalism.  For 
Anderson, the narrative of nationalism follows a conception of 
simultaneity, in which time, is “an idea of homogeneous, empty-
time, in which simultaneity is, as it were, transverse, cross-time, 
marked not by prefiguring and fulfillment, but by temporal 
coincidence, and measured by clock and calendar.”23 The age of 
nationalism is represented by the connection of past and future, 
which is what gives a national community its distinct identity, and 
culture.  This is not merely a “Modern” mode of interpretation and 
criticism, but one that was in play ever since historical 
consciousness was awaken in Europe at least by the fifteenth-
century; after all the dialectic of ancients and moderns in history 
dated as far back as Machiavelli.24 
 The Great War was a culmination of the traditional modes 
of cultural representations coupled with the discourses of the 
Modern being played out on the battlefield. Although there had 
been wars between nation-states in Europe before, the First World 
War marked the first conflict that encompassed the whole of every 
national community involved. Even the neutral nations, as far 
                                                
22 Ibid., 4-5. 
23 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 24. 
24 Niccolò Machiavelli, Selected Political Writings, ed. David Wootton, 
(Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub. Co., 1994), 159. 
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away as the United States, would not be left untouched. There is 
no discontinuity in the twentieth century between the traditional 
and the Modern, surely the romantic images of war were lost by 
1918, especially once the war poets and novelists got their hands 
on them, but the men and women of the generation of 1914, the 
masses that made up the armies and workers, went to war that year 
based on the ideas and representations that composed their national 
identities - the war for all belligerent nations was justified by 
defense of the common, collective identity.  However the Great 
War was such a traumatic event, it left many aloft and devoid of 
meaning. The huge excesses in killing and destruction, even after 
the war, made people feel at the time that the war did offer a break 
with the past. After all, how could Europe go back to the way 
things were after such a catastrophe? And although has Jay Winter 
as pointed out, “Auschwitz was not Verdun”, it still must be 
remembered that the “lost generation” of 1914 were executioners 
as well as victims.25  
 
The Nation at War: Singularity and Universality 
Most historians would maintain that the nationalist 
narrative began in France. The Great Revolution had created both 
internal and external concerns, which made it necessary for the 
numerous revolutionary governments to promote the idea of not 
only the nation, but also of the “Republic” in order to maintain 
what had been gained.  There were of course movements against 
this: one can only think of the slaughter of the Vendée, and the 
alienation of the clergy.  However, for the most part, the nationalist 
zeal that overtook France and Europe was quite successful.  The 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen declared: “The 
principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation. No 
body, no individual can exercise authority that does not expressly 
emanate from it” (article 3).  The nation was to be the collective 
representation of “the general will” that Rousseau had argued 
should be the basis of political government.  As for Rousseau: 
“What causes human misery is the contradiction…between nature 
and social institutions, between man and citizen…Give him over 
                                                
25 J.M. Winter, “Catastrophe and Culture: Recent Trends in the Historiography 
of the First World War,” The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 64, No. 3 (Sept. 
1992): 532. 
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entirely to the state or leave him entirely to himself, but if you 
divide his heart you destroy him.”26 In this sense, as a Republic, 
France had chosen to be a nation of citizens, one of civilization, 
not of barbarism.  
 The problems that this causes, argues Tzvetan Todorov is 
that “Legitimation via the nation instead of God has been viewed 
as inseparable from preference for one’s own country at the 
expense of universal principles, membership in a culture - which is 
undeniable and unavoidable - has come to justify the requirement 
that cultural and political entities should coincide.”27 However, 
Todorov has pointed out: “the ‘internal’ nation proceeds from the 
idea of equality, while the ‘external’ nation implies on the contrary 
a preferential choice in favor of one’s own country over all the 
others, thus implying inequality.”28 This is the narrative of national 
community that had formed in the “external” idea of France, the 
geographical construction, which was legitimized by the 
“internal,” cultural France.  Once this distinction between the 
French national community from its neighbors, once the cultural 
and political had been overlapped, the idea that “The French have 
become the foremost people of the universe”, proclaiming one 
deputy in the National Assembly, was created. This notion of 
liberating the beleaguered peoples of Europe from the tyranny of 
monarchical government and despotism grew into the idea of 
“mission civilatrice.” This was based on the moral notion that once 
free, and once they had obtained the rights of man and citizen, it 
was now the duty of the French people to be the beacon of reason 
to the rest of the world, still under the grip of tyrannous kings. 
Durand-Maillane wrote in 1791 that the new constitution “has to 
make the people of France happy, and by imitation, all people.”29 
However, as Eugen Weber points out, it was the rural areas of 
France, and those regions and populations that were hardly 
“French” in the sense of Parisian “civilization,” that were made the 
                                                
26 quoted in Tzvetan Todorov, On Human Diversity: Nationalism, Racism, and 
Exoticism in French Thought (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1993), 180. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Tzvetan Todorov, Hope and Memory: Lessons from the Twentieth Century 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 253. 
29 Todorov, On Human Diversity, 187. 
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object of this “civilizing mission.” Weber makes the point that 
“the people of whole regions [of France] felt little identity with the 
state or with people of other regions” even by 1870.30  It seems that 
France during and after the Revolution, made a greater effort 
attempting to acclimate the French people to the “civilizing 
process” than external peoples. A student in Paris, Georges 
Valérie, wrote in 1901 that “Conquest is a necessary stage on the 
road to nationalism…[A nation should] bring in larger unity 
groups without a clear cultural identity, to draw in, to enrich, to 
enlighten the uninstructed tribal mind, this is the civilizing mission 
we cannot renounce.”31 It was necessary to assimilate rural 
populations for the simple fact that they were generally conceived 
to have no culture of their own; they were still reliant on antiquated 
ways. These communities could therefore only benefit from their 
integration into the larger French community. Weber suggests it 
may be easier to see the integration of peoples into national 
communities in the light of colonialism.  Throughout Western 
Europe this process was hugely successful, mostly because of the 
growth of nationalist education, mainly through the teaching of 
history.   
Schools taught potent lessons of morality focused on duty, 
effort, and seriousness of purpose. This had been the goal of 
François Guizot as early as 1833, when he defined the instruction 
that schools were intended to provide: reading, writing, and 
arithmetic to furnish essential skills, the teaching of French and of 
the metric system to implant or increase the sense of unity under 
French nationhood, moral and religious instruction to serve 
spiritual and social needs.32 The history of France before the Great 
War was presented in a continuous chain, extending back to 
Roman times, one text declaring “Here we are, more than two 
thousand years ago, in the period when France was still called 
Gaul.”33 France here appears less a nation and more an essence 
projected backwards, invoking the idea of la France éternelle. 
                                                
30 Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 
1870-1914 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976), 486. 
31 Quoted from Ibid, 486. 
32 Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen, 331. 
33 Quoted from Ann-Louise Shapiro, “Fixing History: Narratives of World War I 
in France,” History and Theory, Vol.36, No. 4, (Dec., 1997): 114. 
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French soldiers and statesmen became heroes; French culture and 
style was made primary, the very expression of high art; class 
conflict was completely excluded. In all this, France became a 
nation, indeed a spirit that was eternal and undying. Increasingly, 
French nationalism re-emphasized the differences between 
France’s “mission civilatrice” and Germany’s Kultur and 
Weltpolitik; two distinct teleological narratives, each giving divine 
meaning to the community on opposite sides of the Rhine.  These 
kinds of narratives are what Etienne Balibar call “the two 
symmetrical figures of the illusion of national identity”: where 
history articulates both a national personality and a national 
mission.34 The comparison with Germany fundamentally shaped 
the French national community before the war, and these 
assumptions had a profound effect on how it responded in the early 
days as the Germans invaded France herself.  
 Germany for its part saw not only an external difference 
with France, but also to the east of her borders, to the lands of 
Russia. The Prussian victory in 1870 had led most in the German 
military and government to dismiss the French threat to the West, 
fearing only the possibility of a two-front war. Russia’s huge army 
and vastness of territory provided the Germans with an immediate 
concern and also the opportunity to realize its own historical 
mission. For many Germans, Russia provided the opportunities of 
dynastic expansion, but also an exoteric calling of spirituality. 
Sturm und Drang movement members Klinger and Lenz discerned 
in Russia and its people a spiritual breadth, and even Rilke 
considered Russia his spiritual homeland. Artists, musicians, and 
philosophers from Wagner to Nietzsche, from Spengler to Thomas 
Mann reveled in the exotic imagination of the East.35 However, 
this feeling also was coupled with the imperialistic designs of 
many Germans, concluding that the Eastern peoples provided a 
tabula rosa, where the people were still young, and nobly savage, 
for which provided the opportunity for German Kultur to cultivate. 
                                                
34 Etienne Balibar, “The Nation Form: History and Ideology,” Becoming 
National, eds. Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), 132. 
35 Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius, War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National 
Identity and German Occupation in World War I, (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 25. 
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It became a fixation of the German imagination to “Drive to the 
East” (the Drang nach Osten) which had developed by at least the 
1860s. This became a commonly held assumption of Germany’s 
ultimate destiny in the ascension of Weltpolitik.  
 If history provided access to the new temporal conceptions 
of nationalism, then geography and its teaching offered the same 
for the spatial. With the learning of sciences and of cosmography, 
the intake of general terms of geographical landscapes that are 
codified in a descriptive language, presenting pupils with a 
universal reference system, complete with uniform rules.36 
Geography provides names and legitimizes space, it was necessary 
for the nation to move towards the resacralization of one part of 
space – the national territory in the teaching of geography. 
Germany told its students of the “special relationship to the 
landscape” and incarnated a collective myth to conquer Russian 
lands.37 In France, the concept of the “Hexagon” was created. For 
school students the geometric figure of the hexagon allowed them 
to conceptualize the image of France as they learned the geography 
of their country. They were also taught the départements as well; 
learning to recite the departments’ names as well as their 
prefectures and sub-prefectures. Of course, regional boundaries did 
not always follow natural boundaries created by climate, weather, 
rivers, and mountains. The Republic made great efforts in trying to 
integrate these natural geographic realities with the abstract 
boundaries of administrative units. School geography was 
successful in implanting national identity and making this national 
identity the property of every Frenchmen.38 
The outbreak of war in 1914 brought all these totalizing 
principles to the forefront of daily life. Years of nationalist 
sentiment and collective identity now spread over in all spheres of 
cultural life. Furthermore, this was not merely a development left 
to one nation, but was a phenomenon experienced by every nation 
that entered the war, including America, usually presented by 
historians as wanting to avoid the war. Ideological battles between 
                                                
36 Antoine Prost, “The Republican Primary School and French National 
Identity,” Republican Identities in War and Peace: Representations of France in 
the 19th and 20th Centuries (New York, NY: Berg, 2002), 74. 
37 Liulevicius, War Land on the Eastern Front, 170.  
38 Ibid., 77. 
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the academia of the belligerents were fought just as viciously as 
the war on the battlefield. In October 1914, virtually the entire 
German academic profession - over 4,000 names, including almost 
every professor at almost every German university - endorsed a 
declaration entitled “An der Kulturwelt” (To the World of Culture). 
Numbered among them were closet socialists, future pacifists, and 
skeptics, including Max Weber and Alfred Einstein.39 Their list of 
denials concluded with two assertions: first, that the future of 
European culture rested on the victory of German so-called 
“militarism”; and secondly, that in defining this militarism there 
was no distinction to be made between Prussia and the rest of 
Germany, or between the German army and the German nation: 
“both are one.”40 “Our belief,” the declaration continues “is that 
the salvation of all European culture depends on the victory for 
which German ‘militarism’ is fighting, the discipline, the loyalty, 
the spirit of sacrifice of the united free German people.”41 German 
Kultur, which embraced concepts that began with the community 
but were defined nationally, the idea of Geist, was taken in contrast 
to “civilization.” Rudolf Eucken, the German philosopher and 
Nobel Prize winner published on “the world historical significance 
of the German spirit,” asserting that Germany could not be 
defeated while it remained truly united and stood fast in its inner 
strength.42 Hew Strachan argues that the war of 1914 had led the 
Germans away from previous advances in culture, and placed them 
on a new path:  
 
The clash between civilization and Kultur took 
German thought back to its late-eighteenth-century 
roots. In condemning civilization, the philosophers 
of 1914 were reflecting the rationality of the 
Enlightenment and the consequences of the French 
Revolution. They argued that, following what was 
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essentially an alien, French track, philosophy had 
elevated the rule of law and the rights of the 
individual, and so had promoted selfishness and 
materialism. At one level, therefore the summons of 
1914 was a call to rediscover the ideas of the 
Aufklärung and to refurbish the memory of 1813.43  
 
It was yet another clash between the discourses of the traditional 
and the Modern. 
 This declaration by the German academic profession only 
legitimated the claims of their French counterparts. The French 
responded with their declaration on November 3. It contained the 
names of 100 members of the French literary and artistic world, 
including Gerorges Clemenceau, Barrès, Debussy, Gide, Matisse, 
and Monet. Declaring that “the intellectual and moral richness of 
humanity is created by the natural variety and independence of all 
nations’ gifts,” it was clear that it was a statement of the kind of 
universalizing principle that the Republic had always claimed as 
the self-anointed beacon of civilization.44 On December 12, 
Bergson told the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques that 
German philosophy was “a translation into intellectual terms of her 
brutality, her appetites, and her vices.” Germany’s actions were 
merely “barbarism reinforced by civilization.”45 The image of the 
barbarous German enemy was not merely used to legitimize the 
war cause. It also offered an opportunity to be directed towards 
particular ends, such as war loans or military recruitment, and to 
solicit the support of foreign neutrals.46  
As the ideological battles were being fought with words 
and documents, the realities of war were being experienced by 
ordinary soldiers and civilians in the front-lines and in the 
occupied territories. Few had to be read rhetoric about the brutality 
of war in 1914. However, many used the nationalist discourse to 
make sense of what was happening around them. As the Germans 
                                                
43 Strachan, The First World War, 1129-30. 
44 Ibid., 1121. 
45 Henri Bergson, Meaning of War: Life and Matter in Conflict (London: T.F. 
Unwin, 1915), 33. 
46 John Horne and Alan Kramer, German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), 292. 
  
 
38 
approached the city of Lille, Madame Delahaye-Théry, witnessed 
the retreat of the French army, and wrote that “The Germans are 
coming. It’s the end. The end for us.”47 It must be remembered that 
although most of the stories of German barbarization were 
exaggerated, horrible events did take place. As Modris Eksteins 
put it:  
 
If babies were not systematically snatched from 
mothers’ arms and smashed against brick walls, if 
nuns were not deliberately sought out for sodomy, 
rape, and slaughter, if old people were not made to 
crawl on all fours before being riddled with bullets, 
considerable numbers of hostages were shot, 
including women and children and octogenarians.48 
 
 It must also be remembered that the “atrocities” committed by the 
Germans, while both real and definite, the representations used by 
the French and Allies to designate the German enemy were also a 
manner, and John Horne and Allan Kramer point out: “To find a 
language for the realities of the German invasion.”49 However, 
taken further, it could also, and should be said that it was the 
attempt at elucidation of the realities of warfare in the age of 
national communities and total war. The Germans were certainly 
not alone in perpetrating brutal acts in 1914, and the equivocal use 
of imagery, such as myths of the franc-tireur and the French with 
the severed hands, reduced a complex and emotionally charged 
situation to an emblematic person or action.50 Naturally, women 
and children were for the French the most readily accessible link to 
the imagery of a peaceful France forced into war by the German 
aggressor. The image of raped women and severed hands became 
the signifier to the cause of the national community. The myths 
provided accessible justifications for the continuation of the war, 
and outlined a purpose for the unity now obtained by the state. In 
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this way, the national community, the state, and the war were 
forged into one mentality, one experience, and one representation 
that made the conflict seem as a fight to death, initiating a fatalism 
and grim determination that only helped to totalize the war further. 
Rudolf Binding, a German soldier serving on the Western 
Front during 1918, wrote in his diary on August 12, expressing that 
what he was experiencing during the war was something that was a 
part of “uncontrollable movements and forces”: 
 
In the end, even if an individual nation does not get 
its deserts, humanity will. This generation has no 
future, and deserves none. Anyone who belongs to 
it lives no more. It is almost a consolation to realize 
this. All that an individual can do to get out of the 
wrack is to find some way of hewing out blocks of 
stone wherewith to found a new structure which to 
this generation will be nothing, and leave it as a 
legacy to others.51 
 
Binding’s prophetic words would indeed become realized: the 
legacy of the First World War would surely be remembered in 
stone, but the largest exposition of the legacy of the “lost 
generation” would be expressed through history itself. The 
mistakes made prior to and during 1914 would be repeated again 
and again to this very day. The language of the national 
community, although apparently held to be singular to the specific 
community, is in reality a universal logic aimed at totalizing. This 
is how we must look at the First World War when attempting to 
understand how and why this war, and the rest of the twentieth 
century became the horrible blood-bath that it was.
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